How often have attorneys encountered a citation to a lengthy judicial opinion, deposition transcript, or contract, only to find themselves searching through dozens, or even hundreds, of pages to locate the passage supposedly supporting the proposition being advanced?

Beginning December 1, 2026, that practice will no longer satisfy the Rules of New York’s Commercial Division.

On October 28, 2026, Chief Administrative Judge Joseph A. Zayas signed Administrative Order AO/310/2026, amending Rule 6 of the Rules of the Commercial Division (22 NYCRR § 202.70) by adding a new subsection (e). The amendment establishes specific pinpoint citation requirements for legal memoranda, letter briefs, affidavits, affirmations, and exhibits.

What Does the New Rule Require?

Under amended Rule 6(e), practitioners must identify the precise location of the material upon which they rely, rather than simply citing the source generally.

The new requirements include:

  • Legal authorities: Citations must identify the specific page containing the proposition for which the authority is cited.
  • Deposition transcripts: Citations must include the relevant page and line numbers.
  • Affidavits and affirmations: Citations must identify the relevant page and paragraph numbers.
  • Exhibits: Citations must provide equivalent specificity, such as the page and section number of a contract or other document.
  • NYSCEF filings: Citations to documents filed electronically must include the NYSCEF document number and the relevant location within the document.

For example, rather than citing generally to a previously filed memorandum, practitioners should identify the particular filing and page, such as “NYSCEF Doc. 30, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law at p. 4.”

The amendment also provides that a filing party complying with the NYSCEF citation requirement may exceed the otherwise applicable word limit under Commercial Division Rule 17 by an additional 100 words.

Why Does This Matter?

The Commercial Division was established to provide a specialized forum for the efficient and effective resolution of complex business disputes. Yet even seemingly routine practices can undermine that objective.

Consider a memorandum of law citing a 40-page judicial opinion without identifying the relevant page. The attorney reviewing the submission must locate the purported supporting language, determine whether it actually supports the proposition asserted, and evaluate its significance. The same burden falls on the court. Multiply that exercise across numerous citations, lengthy submissions, and multiple motions, and the cumulative expenditure of time becomes substantial.

The problem is even more pronounced when citations refer generally to voluminous deposition transcripts or documentary exhibits.

In proposing the amendment, the Commercial Division Advisory Council looked to the Texas Business Court, which recently adopted similar pinpoint citation requirements. The Advisory Council recognized that even with modern electronic filing, bookmarking, and hyperlinking capabilities, the absence of precise citations continues to create unnecessary work for judges, attorneys, and litigants.

The new Rule places the burden of providing precise citations squarely on the attorney relying upon the authority or evidence. Rather than requiring opposing counsel and the court to search for supporting material, the citing attorney must identify precisely where that material can be found.

Practical Implications for Commercial Division Practitioners

The amendment will require law firms to pay closer attention to their drafting, editing, and citation-checking practices.

Attorneys should ensure that every citation is sufficiently specific and that the referenced material actually supports the proposition for which it is offered. This is particularly important in complex commercial litigation, where motion papers frequently rely upon extensive documentary records and numerous judicial authorities.

The requirement should also encourage attorneys to be more precise in their legal arguments. Identifying the specific passage supporting a proposition should help eliminate vague or overbroad citations and promote more focused submissions.

Questions remain regarding how strictly Commercial Division Justices will enforce the new requirements and whether similar rules may eventually be adopted more broadly throughout New York’s courts.

The Bottom Line

By requiring pinpoint citations, the Commercial Division has taken another practical step toward reducing unnecessary work, improving the quality of submissions, and advancing its longstanding commitment to the efficient resolution of complex commercial disputes.

The amendment should save valuable time for both the courts and litigants by eliminating the need to search through lengthy opinions, transcripts, and exhibits to locate supporting material. Commercial Division practitioners would be well advised to incorporate these requirements into their drafting and citation-checking practices before the December 1, 2026 effective date.

To learn more about new developments in the Westchester Commercial Division, please subscribe to the Westchester Commercial Division Blog.

Discovery disputes have long been a source of frustration for litigants, attorneys, and courts alike. As the New York State Commercial Division Advisory Council recently observed, “[d]iscovery disputes were viewed nearly 40 years ago, and remain today, the most prolific generator of pre-trial motions.”

To address this persistent problem, Chief Administrative Judge Joseph A. Zayas signed Administrative Order AO/299/26 on October 8, 2026, amending Rule 14 of the Rules of the Commercial Division (22 NYCRR § 202.70). The amendments, which take effect December 1, 2026, strengthen the obligation of counsel to meaningfully confer before seeking judicial intervention in discovery disputes.

The Problem: Too Many Discovery Disputes, Too Little Cooperation

In its February 24, 2026 memorandum recommending the amendments, the Commercial Division Advisory Council cited Eaton v. Chahl, 146 Misc. 2d 977 [Sup Ct, Rensselaer County 1988], in which the court observed:

“Most seasoned litigators know that, with a modicum of good sense, discovery disputes can and should be resolved by the attorneys without the necessity of judicial intervention.”

Nearly four decades later, that observation remains as relevant as ever. Unfortunately, the continued proliferation of discovery motions suggests that a “modicum of good sense” does not always prevail in litigation.

The amendments seek to change that by making clear that the obligation to confer in good faith is more than a procedural formality.

What Has Changed?

1. A More Meaningful Meet-and-Confer Requirement.

Amended Rule 14(b) requires counsel, absent exigent circumstances, to engage in a “thorough, good-faith attempt to resolve or narrow” discovery disputes before seeking judicial intervention.

Importantly, the Rule calls for direct personal consultation, such as through in-person or electronic conferences. As the Advisory Council explained, perfunctory exchanges of emails, letters, or telephone calls are not enough. Counsel must engage in meaningful discussions aimed at resolving disputes or, at a minimum, narrowing the issues requiring judicial attention.

2. More Detailed Certifications of Good Faith.

Where a dispute remains unresolved, counsel seeking court intervention must submit a letter not exceeding three single-spaced pages, together with a certification describing the parties’ efforts to resolve the dispute.

The certification must identify:

  • The dates and manner of consultation;
  • The attorneys and other participants involved;
  • The specific results achieved; and
  • Whether the parties discussed cost-shifting, proportionality, or alternative methods of discovery that might resolve or narrow the dispute.

Alternatively, counsel must establish good cause for the absence of consultation.

Affected opposing parties and non-parties must submit responsive letters within four business days and may challenge the initiating party’s certification.

3. Greater Flexibility in Judicial Conferences.

Amended Rule 14(c) provides that, following the parties’ submissions, the court will schedule a conference, which may be conducted in person or electronically, either by the court or by non-judicial personnel.

Where the conference is conducted by the court, the court may issue an appropriate order without requiring formal motion practice or permit a formal motion where necessary. Conferences conducted by non-judicial personnel remain subject to Rule 14-a.

4. Stronger Consequences for Noncompliance.

Perhaps most significantly, amended Rule 14(d) expressly authorizes courts to deny discovery motions, without prejudice to renewal, where counsel fail to comply with the Rule’s requirements.

Alternatively, the court may hold a motion in abeyance pending completion of its informal dispute-resolution procedures.

Previously, Rule 14 expressly contemplated holding motions in abeyance but did not expressly authorize their denial for noncompliance.

What This Means for Commercial Division Practitioners

The amendments reinforce a fundamental principle of Commercial Division practice: discovery should advance the resolution of commercial disputes, not become a separate battleground that unnecessarily increases litigation costs and burdens judicial resources.

The revised Rule also preserves the authority of individual Commercial Division Justices to establish their own procedures for handling discovery disputes. Accordingly, practitioners appearing before Westchester Commercial Division Justices, Hon. Linda Jamieson and Hon. Gretchen Walsh, and throughout the state, should continue to consult the applicable Part Rules.

Ultimately, the message is straightforward: before asking the court to resolve a discovery dispute, counsel must make a genuine effort to resolve it themselves.

The hope is that these amendments will encourage greater cooperation, reduce unnecessary motion practice, and further the Commercial Division’s longstanding commitment to the efficient and cost-effective resolution of complex business disputes.

The amendments take effect December 1, 2026.

To learn more about new developments in the Westchester Commercial Division, please subscribe to the Westchester Commercial Division Blog.

The New York State Office of Court Administration is seeking public comment on a proposed amendment to the Rules of the Commercial Division that would add a new Rule 25-a authorizing the use of Virtual Evidence Courtrooms (VECs). The proposal, developed by the Commercial Division Advisory Council, is now open for public comment until August 16, 2025.

According to the Advisory Council’s memorandum in support of the proposed rule, “[t]he integration of technology into courtroom practice has become increasingly vital for enhancing efficiency and accessibility in legal proceedings,” and VECs “represent a significant technological advance, offering a secure, digital platform for managing and presenting evidence during trials.”

The proposed rule would allow Commercial Division justices to “require or permit” the use of VECs in appropriate cases. As explained in the Advisory Council’s memorandum, VECs provide a centralized and secure environment where the court and parties can upload, view, annotate, and reference evidentiary materials electronically – offering “substantial benefits to both the court and litigants.”

The Council concludes that encouraging VEC use would further the Commercial Division’s longstanding reputation for procedural innovation and judicial modernization. “By encouraging the use of VECs,” the memorandum states, “the Commercial Division can continue its mission of promoting procedural efficiency and maintaining its reputation as a leader in judicial modernization.”

Comments should be submitted by August 16, 2025, via email to rulecomments@nycourts.gov with the subject line: “Comments on Proposed VEC Rule.”

We will continue to track this proposal and report on developments that may affect practice in the Westchester Commercial Division.

To learn more about new developments in the Westchester Commercial Division, please subscribe to the Westchester Commercial Division Blog.

In a June 6, 2025 decision by Justice Linda S. Jamieson in Moshe Bain v. Samuel Strulovitch, et al., the Westchester County Commercial Division denied two motions to dismiss in a complex dispute concerning ownership interests in a Mount Vernon nursing home and the real estate on which it operates. The litigation centers on the legal effect of a rabbinical arbitration award issued without the participation of all stakeholders.

Background

The case involves Parkview Operating Co., LLC (the operator of Westchester Center for Rehabilitation and Nursing) and Westchester Gardens Realty LLC (owner of the facility’s real property). Plaintiff Moshe Bain, a minority owner in both entities, challenges a rabbinical arbitration award initiated by Samuel Strulovitch, who claimed an ownership interest despite not being listed among the members of Parkview or Westchester Gardens.

Bain and nominal defendant Robert Bleier allege that the arbitration was conducted without notice to them, and that the resulting award—finding that Strulovitch owns 22% of the operation and realty—improperly impacts their ownership stakes and rights, including rights of first refusal.

In response, Strulovitch and affiliated entities moved to dismiss the petition and Bleier’s cross-claims, arguing that neither Bain nor Bleier had standing to challenge the rabbinical award because they were not parties to the arbitration or its underlying agreement.

The Court’s Decision

Justice Jamieson rejected the defendants’ arguments, holding that:

  • The existence of an arbitration agreement must be determined at a hearing if there is a factual dispute. The Court found that the evidence—including communications by Strulovitch’s rabbinical representative expressing conditional willingness to arbitrate—raised factual issues as to whether an arbitration agreement existed.
  • Standing to challenge the award was not foreclosed under CPLR § 7511(b)(2), which permits a non-party to seek vacatur where their rights are prejudiced and they were not served with a notice of intention to arbitrate. Since Bain and Bleier had no opportunity to participate and their ownership interests may be materially affected, the Court declined to dismiss their claims on this ground.
  • The case presents substantial controversies warranting judicial resolution, including whether the Rockland arbitration was valid, whether the award impacts Bain and Bleier’s interests, and whether the parties agreed to a subsequent arbitration in Brooklyn that might supersede the original award.

Key Takeaways

This decision reinforces the principle that arbitration, even in religious or alternative fora, must comply with basic procedural protections—particularly notice and opportunity to participate—when the rights of non-parties are at stake. The ruling also highlights the nuanced standards for standing under CPLR § 7511 and the importance of factual development when determining the existence of an arbitration agreement.

The case will proceed, and a hearing may be required to resolve disputed issues surrounding the validity and enforceability of the arbitration process and award.

To learn more about new developments in the Westchester Commercial Division, please subscribe to the Westchester Commercial Division Blog.

In Bardy v. Bonnem, Index No. 55909/2023, Justice Linda S. Jamieson of the Westchester County Commercial Division issued a detailed decision addressing contract formation, fiduciary duties, and quasi-contract claims in the context of a failed business venture.

Background

The case arose out of an alleged oral agreement between plaintiff Jack Bardy, an experienced hospitality industry professional, and defendant Joseph Edward Bonnem, an investor seeking to develop a chain of drive-through coffee establishments under the “Ready Coffee” brand. Bardy claimed that, following negotiations in 2016, he and Bonnem reached an agreement under which Bardy would assist in developing the business and, in exchange, would acquire an option to purchase a 25% ownership interest in Ready Coffee through staged payments. Bardy alleged he performed extensive work over several years without compensation, relying on the alleged agreement and Bonnem’s representations.

After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing all claims.

The Court’s Ruling

Justice Jamieson granted the motion in part and denied it in part, providing a helpful roadmap on several recurring issues that often arise in business litigation:

1. Breach of Contract Claim Dismissed — No “Meeting of the Minds”

The Court dismissed Bardy’s breach of contract claim, finding that discovery failed to yield sufficient evidence of any binding agreement. Although Bardy pointed to a November 2016 email proposal and alleged oral acceptance, the Court found no contemporaneous writings or other evidence to establish that both parties ever finalized essential terms. Importantly, the Court emphasized the absence of any signed partnership or operating agreement, and credited testimony from the parties — including the mutual acquaintance who introduced them — confirming that no ownership deal was ever consummated.

The Court’s analysis relied on well-established principles that contract formation requires a meeting of the minds on all essential terms. Without such evidence, the breach of contract claim could not survive summary judgment.

2. Quasi-Contract Claims Survive — Dispute Over Uncompensated Services

While dismissing the breach of contract claim, the Court declined to dismiss Bardy’s claims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. The record, the Court held, contained sufficient evidence to raise triable issues as to whether Bardy provided valuable services to Ready Coffee without compensation.

Bardy submitted evidence that he performed significant work for Ready Coffee between 2016 and 2019, including recruiting key personnel, developing branding and marketing materials, preparing employee manuals, crafting menus, and leveraging business contacts. Although defendants disputed the value of Bardy’s contributions—arguing that much of his work was either duplicative or substandard—the Court held that these factual disputes must be resolved at trial.

Justice Jamieson also rejected defendants’ argument that the quasi-contract claims were duplicative of the now-dismissed contract claim, emphasizing that the theories of recovery and measures of damages differ.

3. Fiduciary Duty, Constructive Trust, and Accounting Claims Dismissed

The Court granted summary judgment dismissing Bardy’s fiduciary duty, constructive trust, and equitable accounting claims, holding that no fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. The Court found that Bardy and Bonnem were sophisticated business people engaged in an arm’s-length transaction, and Bardy’s evidence of unpaid work was not sufficient to transform their relationship into one of trust and confidence.

Takeaways

The decision in Bardy v. Bonnem illustrates several key principles frequently litigated in Westchester’s Commercial Division:

  • Oral business arrangements—particularly among sophisticated parties—face significant evidentiary hurdles when challenged in litigation. Absent clear documentation of agreed-upon terms, contract claims may not survive.
  • Claims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit can serve as viable fallback positions where contract formation fails but will turn on proof of the value of services rendered and whether it would be inequitable for defendants to retain those benefits without compensation.
  • Courts are reluctant to impose fiduciary duties in arm’s-length business dealings absent evidence of special trust or reliance.

As the case proceeds to trial on the remaining quasi-contract claims, Bardy serves as a reminder of the importance of clear documentation when negotiating startup ventures and business collaborations.

To learn more about new developments in the Westchester Commercial Division, please subscribe to the Westchester Commercial Division Blog.

On May 20, 2025, the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts signed Administrative Order 111/25, introducing significant developments for litigators practicing in the Commercial Division. Effective July 7, 2025, the Order adds a new Appendix E – a Model Pre-Trial Order – to Section 202.70 of the Uniform Rules of the Supreme and County Courts and amends the preamble to Commercial Division Rules 25–33.

These changes aim to promote consistency, preparation, and efficiency in the lead-up to trial while preserving judicial flexibility. The newly adopted Model Pre-Trial Order is designed to serve as a practical “tool” for both courts and counsel. It consolidates in one document the core pre-trial activities governed by Commercial Division Rules 27 through 33, including:

  • Mandatory settlement conferences (Rule 30)
  • Motions in limine (Rule 27)
  • Exhibit and deposition coordination (Rules 28–29)
  • Stipulations of undisputed facts and expert testimony (Rule 30)
  • Witness disclosures and pre-trial memoranda (Rules 31–32)
  • Direct testimony by affidavit in non-jury trials (Rule 32-a)
  • Jury charges and verdict forms (Rule 31(c))

Although use of the model order is not mandatory, it is encouraged as a starting point that courts may adapt to reflect their individual practices and preferences. The amended preamble reinforces the importance of thorough pre-trial preparation and the role of cooperation among counsel to ensure efficient case management.

The model order and revised rules are particularly relevant in Westchester County’s Commercial Division, where Justices Jamieson and Walsh actively emphasize streamlined trial preparation and robust pre-trial conferences. Practitioners appearing in Westchester should review these changes and be prepared to incorporate the model order into their litigation planning.

The full text of Administrative Order 111/25 is available here, and we encourage all counsel practicing in the Commercial Division to familiarize themselves with Appendix E before the effective date of July 7, 2025.

To learn more about new developments in the Westchester Commercial Division, please subscribe to the Westchester Commercial Division Blog.

In Gregory F. Holcombe v. James L. Moskovitz and JOY-CPW, Inc., Index No. 67400/2024, Justice Linda S. Jamieson of the Westchester Commercial Division denied a motion to appoint a receiver over the judgment debtor’s business assets. The court found the request premature, as the plaintiff had not yet exhausted other available enforcement tools.

Background 

The plaintiff, Gregory Holcombe, previously obtained a judgment for over $409,000 against defendants James Moskovitz and his company, JOY-CPW, Inc. (“JOY”), arising from unpaid promissory notes. Following that judgment, Holcombe moved to appoint a receiver under CPLR § 5228 to seize and manage JOY’s assets—including intangible property such as intellectual property, archives, royalties, commissions, and revenue-generating contracts—in an effort to satisfy the debt. 

Plaintiff argued that such relief was necessary given the defendants’ alleged evasive conduct. Holcombe claimed that after serving an information subpoena on a bank, defendants falsely told the bank a stay was forthcoming. The referenced “stay” was allegedly based on a separate action the defendants filed in New York County, in which a judge declined to sign an order to show cause to stay the Westchester judgment. 

Plaintiff contended that JOY’s business was complex and involved commingled accounts and intangible assets that would require skilled management for liquidation—factors supporting the appointment of a receiver. 

Defendants’ Opposition 

The defendants did not dispute the outstanding judgment but characterized Holcombe’s actions as part of a vendetta. They argued that a receivership would irreparably harm the company and its stakeholders, which include production personnel, station workers, and the defendants themselves. Moskovitz contended that the value of the business lies in its goodwill, specialized knowledge, and his personal involvement—making it unsuitable for liquidation through a receiver. 

They urged the court to give them time to pay the judgment voluntarily and asserted, without offering a payment plan or documentation, that full repayment would be made in due course. They also referenced a bankruptcy proceeding filed by Moskovitz’s wife as a factor in resolving the judgment, though the court noted they provided no timeline or connection between that proceeding and Holcombe’s claim. 

The Court’s Analysis 

Justice Jamieson denied the motion, finding that the high bar for appointing a receiver under CPLR § 5228 had not been met. The statute allows the appointment of a receiver when “a special reason appears to justify one.” The court cited the Court of Appeals’ decision in Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v Falor, 14 NY3d 303 (2010), which sets forth factors for evaluating such requests: (1) availability of alternative remedies, (2) likelihood of collection via receivership, and (3) risk of fraud or insolvency without one. Here, Holcombe had taken only minimal enforcement steps—serving restraining notices and subpoenas—and had not demonstrated that those methods were inadequate.

The court emphasized that it was too early in the enforcement process to appoint a receiver, especially where no showing had been made that a receivership would increase the likelihood of satisfying the judgment. Justice Jamieson also noted that receiverships are particularly appropriate for intangible assets with no ready market that cannot be sold by a sheriff. While JOY’s assets might fall into that category, the plaintiff had not yet taken the intermediate steps necessary to justify such a drastic remedy. 

Conclusion 

The court denied the motion for a receiver as premature but issued a cautionary note: plaintiff may renew the application if defendants obstruct future enforcement efforts. To that end, the court directed Holcombe to re-serve his restraining notices and subpoenas and ordered defendants to respond promptly and refrain from interfering with judgment enforcement. 

This ruling underscores the Westchester Commercial Division’s measured approach to post-judgment enforcement and its reluctance to grant extraordinary relief such as receiverships unless the record clearly demonstrates the need. Judgment creditors must first exhaust standard collection tools before turning to more aggressive remedies. 

To learn more about new developments in the Westchester Commercial Division, please subscribe to the Westchester Commercial Division Blog.

Starting July 7, 2025, a new Rule 23 will take effect in the Commercial Division of the New York Supreme Court, authorizing the filing of amicus curiae briefs for the first time in trial-level proceedings. This important development further cements the Commercial Division’s role—both statewide and here in Westchester—as a forward-thinking venue for resolving sophisticated business disputes.

The new rule, adopted by Administrative Order of Chief Administrative Judge Joseph A. Zayas, allows non-parties to seek leave to submit amicus briefs by motion, typically brought on by order to show cause. The movant must file the proposed brief with its motion and make specified disclosures regarding its interest in the matter and any involvement by the parties or third parties in the brief’s preparation or funding. The court may deny the motion if it would cause judicial recusal or undue delay.

The rule was proposed by the Commercial Division Advisory Council, which noted that, unlike appellate courts, trial courts generally lack formal procedures for considering amicus briefs. The Council emphasized that the Commercial Division’s unique docket—regularly featuring high-stakes and precedential commercial matters—makes it especially well-suited for a rule encouraging thoughtful input from outside stakeholders.

As the Advisory Council explained, Rule 23 will “distinguish the Commercial Division from other trial courts and build upon its reputation as a leading and innovative court for resolving significant litigation.”

In Westchester, where the Commercial Division is overseen by Justices Linda Jamieson and Gretchen Walsh, the new rule provides a clear mechanism for industry groups, bar associations, and other interested entities to weigh in on cases that may have broader business implications. It also reflects the continued evolution of the Commercial Division into a model of specialized, efficient, and transparent judicial administration.

For litigants and practitioners in Westchester, Rule 23 opens the door to more robust legal discourse and may offer valuable support in cases that raise novel or complex legal questions. As the Commercial Division continues to innovate, this latest addition further enhances its standing as a national leader in commercial adjudication.

To learn more about new developments in the Westchester Commercial Division, please subscribe to the Westchester Commercial Division Blog.

Westchester Commercial Division Justice Linda S. Jamieson issued a detailed Decision and Order in Camsan Inc. v. OPRA III LLC, Index No. 64814/2022 (and related actions), addressing multiple motions involving mechanic’s liens filed against a large residential construction project in Rye. The decision clarifies the application of New York’s Lien Law in the context of condominium developments and reaffirms the courts’ liberal approach toward lien enforcement.

Background

The case involves an expansive and complex construction project at 120 Old Post Road in Rye, now a condominium property. Numerous contractors and suppliers—ranging from general contractor Hudson Meridian Construction Group to smaller subcontractors like Camsan Inc., Valex Enterprises, and GFC Lighting—filed mechanic’s liens after allegedly not being paid for their work.

The property owner, OPRA III LLC (“OPRA”), moved to discharge all liens, asserting that they were facially invalid. OPRA argued that the liens (1) were filed against outdated or incorrect lot designations, (2) included sold units that were no longer owned by OPRA, or (3) were improper “blanket liens” against the entire condominium.

Multiple lienholders cross-moved to amend their liens nunc pro tunc to reflect only unsold units or those still owned by OPRA, and also sought court orders compelling OPRA to disclose ownership details.

Legal Analysis

Justice Jamieson rejected OPRA’s attempt to invalidate the liens wholesale, emphasizing several key principles of New York lien law:

  1. Liberal Construction of Lien Law: Citing Court of Appeals and Second Department precedent, the court reiterated that the Lien Law is remedial in nature and should be construed liberally to protect the rights of contractors and suppliers. Technical defects—such as overbroad property descriptions—do not necessarily invalidate a lien.
  1. Substantial Compliance Standard: The court found that the lienholders had substantially complied with the Lien Law. Even where a lien encompassed more property than appropriate, it could be enforced against the portion properly subject to the lien. Justice Jamieson cited E. Coast Mines & Materials Corp. v Golf Course Props. Co., 228 AD2d 545 [2d Dep’t 1996] as controlling authority.
  1. Doctrine of Laches Applies to Lien Challenges: The court found OPRA’s delay in raising challenges to the liens troubling. OPRA had participated in discovery and mediation for over a year without objecting to the liens’ validity. Justice Jamieson held that such delay prejudiced the lienholders, making OPRA’s position susceptible to a laches defense.
  1. Lien Validity Despite Condominium Conversion: Even though OPRA had sold some units, it still retained ownership of others at the time many liens were filed. Thus, consistent with Mussen v Franklin Square Assocs., V., LLC, 22 AD3d 1022, 1023 [3d Dep’t 2005], the liens remained valid as to the units still owned by OPRA and were not invalid on their face.

Ruling

In the Court’s Decision & Order, Justice Jamieson:

  • Denied OPRA’s motion to discharge the liens, except as to three defaulting parties.
  • Permitted all lienholders to amend their liens nunc pro tunc to properly identify unsold or OPRA-owned units.
  • Directed OPRA to disclose with particularity which units it currently owns and which it owned at the time each lien was filed.
  • Denied all requests for escrow or attorneys’ fees.

Conclusion

This ruling underscores the Commercial Division’s continued fidelity to the Lien Law’s remedial purpose. Owners seeking to challenge mechanic’s liens must do so promptly and cannot rely on hypertechnical defects—especially where the underlying labor and materials benefited the property. The decision is a reminder to contractors and owners alike that equity, timing, and a fair reading of the law all play crucial roles in lien enforcement.

To learn more about new developments in the Westchester Commercial Division, please subscribe to the Westchester Commercial Division Blog.

On January 28, 2025, New York State’s Chief Administrative Judge signed Administrative Order #38-2025, setting in motion significant changes for the Commercial Division’s jurisdiction over cases seeking only equitable or declaratory relief. Here’s what you need to know:

What’s Changing?

Until now, parties seeking treatment in the Commercial Division simply had to certify that their case was “presumptively commercial” according to the Rules for Commercial Division assignment. However, effective March 31, 2025, any case seeking exclusively equitable or declaratory relief must now also meet a county-specific monetary threshold. For Westchester County, that threshold is set at $100,000.

How Is the Threshold Determined?

The Court will assess whether a case meets the monetary requirement by considering the “value of the object of the action.” Under the new rule, this value is defined as the greatest of the following: (1) the value of the suit’s intended benefit; (2) the value of the right being protected; and (3) the value of the injury being averted.

This assessment is based on the details provided in the Commercial Division addendum and the operative pleadings at the time the party applies for Commercial Division assignment.

Why the Change?

The amendment, proposed by the Commercial Division Advisory Council, aims to streamline the Division’s caseload. By requiring a monetary threshold even for cases solely seeking equitable or declaratory relief, the Division hopes to reduce the number of less resource-intensive cases. This shift is intended to allow the Division to focus more effectively on complex and high-stakes litigations that demand its specialized resources.

Impact on Practitioners and Litigants

  • For Attorneys: When filing for Commercial Division assignment, it will no longer be sufficient to simply certify a case as “presumptively commercial.” Attorneys must now carefully evaluate the monetary value of the case’s benefits or potential injury, ensuring that they meet the set threshold for Westchester County.
  • For Litigants: Parties must be prepared to demonstrate that their case’s “object” meets or exceeds the monetary requirement, which may influence how claims are presented and strategized in the pleadings.

Final Thoughts

This administrative amendment is expected to refine the scope of cases accepted by the Commercial Division. By imposing a clear monetary benchmark, the Division reinforces its commitment to managing its resources effectively and addressing only those cases that genuinely require its specialized attention.

Stay tuned for further updates as the implementation date approaches, and feel free to reach out with any questions or comments regarding this development.

To learn more about new developments in the Westchester Commercial Division, please subscribe to the Westchester Commercial Division Blog.